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This thesis focuses on the recent secession of South Sudan.  The primary research 
questions include an examination of whether or not South Sudan’s 2011 secession 
signaled a break from the O.A.U.’s traditional doctrines of African stability and 
noninterference.  Additionally, this thesis asks: why did the United States and the 
international community at large confer recognition to South Sudan immediately upon its 
independence?  Theoretical models are used to examine the independent variables of 
African stability, ethnic secessionism, and geopolitics on the dependent variables of 
international recognition and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  The history of 
Sudan's peace process is explored, as well as the international forces that helped to bring 
about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.  The factors leading to this unique 
case of African secession are identified, as is the role that the international community 




 In July 2011, the nation of South Sudan formally declared its independence.  
After voting overwhelmingly in a January 2011 referendum to establish their own 
sovereign nation, the people of South Sudan finally exercised their autonomy and 
freedom from the regime in Khartoum.  Although independence is recent for South 
Sudan, the movement to establish an independent state stretches back for decades.  There 
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have been continual movements for a South Sudanese secession throughout much of the 
20th century.   
 Africa has seen a dramatic lack of successful secessionist movements throughout 
its history.  In fact, African borders largely remain as they were at the end of the colonial 
era.  The case of South Sudan remains an outlier in a continent that has seen remarkable 
stability in its borders.  The Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) established doctrines 
of African stability during the period of decolonization in the early 1960s, and this 
influenced the lack of secessionist movements throughout the continent.  
 The primary inquiry of this thesis is: did the 2011 secession of South Sudan signal 
a break from traditional O.A.U. doctrines of stability throughout Africa and 
noninterference in the affairs of sovereign African nations?  The other component to this 
study asks: why did international recognition come so swiftly for the South Sudanese, 
especially in light of the numerous entities throughout the world that lack formal 
recognition of statehood?  The primary independent variables in this study include 
African stability, international perceptions of ethnic secessionism, as well as geopolitical 
influence.  Recognition and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement become the dependent 
variables, and the influence of each independent variable on South Sudan’s swift 
recognition is examined.    
International law evidently plays a major role in the conception of state 
sovereignty.  The process of conferring sovereignty on a state through recognition gives 
that nation distinct rights and advantages in the international community.  What exactly 
goes into the legal recognition of a state, and what powers does this legal recognition 
have within a state to maintain order?  South Sudan was given this recognition 
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immediately, while several candidates for statehood around the world still struggle to 
gain international acceptance.   
 The question of why African borders have persisted for so long is largely a 
question of stability.  Historical accounts of Africa note that the European colonists 
haphazardly drew borders and boundaries in Africa with little regard for ethnic, religious, 
or cultural identity.  However, these colonial-era borders persist long after colonization 
ended.  With the exception of Ethiopia, the map of Africa remains largely unchanged 
from the time the colonists left the continent for good.  This thesis will pinpoint the role 
that organizations such as the O.A.U. played in ensuring a relative amount of stability for 
African borders in order to preserve interstate harmony.      
Also important to this puzzle is the notion of ethnic secessionism, and the 
willingness of the international community to confer recognition onto a secessionist 
movement based purely off of ethnicity.  Differing conceptions of ethnic identity 
certainly exist in Sudan, but were they the tipping point that led the international 
community to support secession for the South?  The question of whether or not countries 
such as the United States viewed the struggle of the South Sudanese as primarily one of 
ethnicity pertains to this study.  The simultaneous occurrences of the CPA signing and 
the Darfur crisis may provide an answer to these inquiries.   
 Geopolitics will be the final independent variable examined in this study.  The 
role that countries such as the United States, as well as other African nations, played in 
the peace process is identified.  Also, it is shown what these countries had at stake in the 
peace process.  Why did the CPA call for a referendum, and why was the international 
community willing to support the insertion of this referendum?  Did the United States 
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strongly favor South Sudanese secession, or did they feel they were “locked in” through 
their participation in the CPA process?  Since international recognition is a key 
component of the overall puzzle, it seems likely that geopolitics will play a role in the 
recognition of South Sudan.   
 
Preview  
This thesis will begin with a literature review on the notions of sovereignty, 
African stability as established by the O.A.U. and the A.U., recognition of ethnic 
secessionism, and geopolitics.  Next comes a brief examination of Sudan’s history, 
including the various peace processes throughout the 20th century.  Following this, there 
is an explanation on the creation of the CPA and the role that it played in making 
secession inevitable.  Finally, the independent variables are tested in order to identify 
which ones had the strongest influence on the secession referendum in the CPA.  
Ultimately, a conclusion will be reached over whether or not the secession of South 
Sudan signaled a break from the O.A.U.’s traditional doctrines of African stability, as 
well as the question of why recognition was conferred so quickly on this new state.    
  
Background-Importance of Sovereignty 
 Before proceeding with an analysis of African stability and international 
recognition, it is necessary to develop a definition of “sovereignty”.  This thesis will 
examine how the concept of sovereignty has interacted with the perpetuation of African 
states since their decolonization.  The question of why African borders remained 
relatively stable throughout the twentieth century is primarily a question of sovereignty.  
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Why have African states, despite political turmoil and violence, been able to, for the most 
part, remain intact?   
 In his study of the changing nature of sovereignty in the modern, globalized era, 
Stephen D. Krasner identifies four operational definitions of sovereignty.  The definitions 
for sovereignty include:  
 Domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a  
 state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority;  
 interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to  
 control transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the  
 mutual recognition of states or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty,  
 referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority  
 configurations.  (1999, 9) 
All of these definitions could explain why African nations have prized border stability 
over the promotion of secessionist movements.  The protection and maintenance of these 
types of sovereignty help to ensure a stable continent overall.  However, since the focus 
of this thesis is on international recognition instead of secessionist movements, only one 
of Krasner’s definitions pertains to the study.   
 International legal sovereignty, then, is more important to the discussion of how 
certain entities are recognized while others are not.  Krasner argues that the precise 
guidelines for conferring sovereignty have not been uniformly applied throughout 
history.  He notes that outside states have historically refused to recognize governments 
that nominally hold control over their territories, while organizations that could not 
legitimately be termed as “governments” have been given recognition.  For example, he 
notes the ambiguities of U.N. recognition of both India and the Philippines even before 
they became independent states.  International institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization give status to entities such as Hong Kong, even though they do not possess 
the legal status of a sovereign state (1999, 15-16).  It is apparent, then, that clear “rules” 
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for conferring sovereignty or authority onto various entities have not been applied in an 
equitable manner. 
 What is the appeal of obtaining international legal sovereignty?  In short, 
recognition by the international community provides a government with “both material 
and normative resources” (Krasner 1999, 16).  These benefits include entry into 
economic and trade agreements to security pacts, from legal rights in other nations to a 
voice in the arena of international decision-making.  Clearly, international legal 
sovereignty remains imperative in order for a state to become an active and thriving 
participant in the world community.  On the domestic front, this type of sovereignty gives 
a certain authority to rulers that they may not have previously enjoyed.  Especially of 
concern to African nations and their often heterogeneous populations is the fact that “a 
ruler attempting to strengthen his own position by creating or reinforcing a particular 
national identity is more likely to be successful if his state or his government enjoys 
international recognition” (Krasner 1999, 17-18).  In a sense, recognition can serve to 
legitimize rulers who may be ripe for internal criticism by bestowing the benefits of being 
a member of the international community on a nation.  The appeal of becoming a full-
fledged member of the United Nations, for example, can lead to economic and security 
benefits within a state (Krasner 1999, 18).   
What is important to keep in mind is the inconsistent manner in which 
international legal sovereignty is often conferred.  States that may not meet all the 
traditional criteria of being sovereign may be given recognition.  Likewise, entities that 
act largely as sovereign nations may be denied recognition by the global community.  
Krasner terms international legal sovereignty as having “clear logics of appropriateness, 
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but these logics are sometimes inconsistent with a logic of consequences.  Given the 
absence of authoritative institutions and power asymmertries, rulers can follow a logic of 
consequences and reject a logic of appropriateness.  Principles have been enduring but 
violated” (1999, 40).  A state does not necessarily need full control over its territory in 
order to be classified as “sovereign” by the international community.  The question of 
why a nation such as South Sudan, with its demonstrably fragile existence, follows from 
an analysis of domestic and international legal sovereignty.  
 
Literature Review- O.A.U./A.U and Sovereignty as Stability 
 Now that a basic understanding of international legal sovereignty has been 
achieved, examining the case of African states and the inflexibility of their borders is 
appropriate.  To shed some light on these issues, the documents related to the 
Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) are detailed, as well as this body’s attempts to 
help African states navigate through the often-precarious period of decolonization.   
The Charter of the O.A.U. explicitly states the goals of the organization: “to 
promote the unity and solidarity; to co-ordinate and intensify their collaboration and 
efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa,” and most importantly, “to 
defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence” (Brownlie 1971, 3).  
From the outset of independence, these new African states established that they would 
work together for the mutual benefit of all.  This Charter proclaims idealistic sentiments 
of international action trumping ethnic and religious differences.  It seems apparent that 
this was an attempt to resist further influence by former colonial powers on these nations.  
Thus, this document was written “to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won 
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independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of [African] States, and 
to resist neo-colonialism in all its forms” (Brownlie 1971, 2).  The Charter made apparent 
the appeal of establishing explicit guarantees of sovereignty.   
 The question of the boundaries demarcating one African state from another faced 
the O.A.U. at its outset.  As Ian Brownlie notes in his compendium of O.A.U. documents, 
“the European expansion in Africa produced a territorial division which bore little or no 
relation to the character and distribution of the populations of the colonies and 
protectorates.  Tribes . . . had their lands intersected by arbitrary political boundaries 
based on historical accident and the bargains of external interests” (1971, 360).  Despite 
the apparent problems colonial borders could cause, the O.A.U. acted quickly to establish 
African borders as fixed after independence.  Internal peace and unity within Africa was 
valued over historic or ethnic grievances that could potentially cause problems within 
states.  The O.A.U.’s 1964 “Resolution on Border Disputes” decreed: 
 Considering that the border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of  
 dissension; Conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvers aiming at  
 dividing the African States; Considering further that the borders of African States, 
 on the day of their independence constitute a tangible reality . . . Recognizing the  
 imperious necessity of settling, by peaceful means and within a strictly African  
 framework, all disputes between African States . . . [the O.A.U.] Solemnly  
 declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing 
 on their achievement of national independence. (Brownlie 1971, 360-361) 
The O.A.U., a newly established international organization, effectively conferred stasis 
on all the borders of these newly independent African nations with the passing of a 
resolution.  It appears the new African leaders who were hesitant about their legitimacy 
in the international community viewed this action as necessary.  Nevertheless, this 
established a precedent that would remain virtually unchallenged throughout the 
twentieth century: the fixing of African borders in their colonial-era positions.  This 
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desired stability, then, comprises one of the independent variables of this thesis.  Stability 
was of preeminent concern to these African leaders, and thus they advocated for policies 
of noninterference and dismissed secessionist calls in order to present a united African 
front to the world.   
 In 1975, more than ten years after the implementation of these O.A.U. documents, 
Scott W. Thompson and William Zartman undertook an analysis of the O.A.U.’s 
decisions in the years after decolonization.  The ultimate purpose of the O.A.U., they 
concluded, was to show internal strength to the rest of the world.  “By advertising their 
presence to the rest of the world,” they wrote, “African states were consciously trying to 
appear more organized and powerful than they actually were, thus eliminating the cause 
of some national insecurities” (El-Ayouty 1976, 3).  Thompson and Zartman also uncover 
the specific reasons as to why the O.A.U. established the fixity of African colonial-era 
borders.  The boundaries of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya in particular were discussed at 
the conferences leading up to the formation of these O.A.U. doctrines.   
Thompson and Zartman point to a debate between Somalia and Kenya occurring 
during the first meetings of the O.A.U.: “Somalia claimed that the legitimate referent was 
the nation, in whose name the nationalist movement had struggled for independence.  
Kenya, on the other hand, claimed that the legitimate referent was the state—the 
sovereign, independent, territorial unit” (El-Ayouty 1976, 5-6).  Thompson and Zartman 
reprint a 1964 debate entitled the “Sanctity of Boundaries as a Norm,” in which O.A.U. 
representatives from both Somalia and Kenya debate matters of sovereignty and borders.  
The Somali representative notes how there are 300,000 Somalis living under the 
jurisdiction of Kenya, whose borders were drawn by the British government.  This 
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representative states Somalia’s “desire to reunite the Somali people as one nation-state on 
the principle of the right to self-determination—a principle firmly entrenched in the 
Charters of the Organization of African Unity and of the United Nations” (El-Ayouty 
1976, 31-32).  The Kenyan representative, on the other hand, appeals to the argument of 
Kenya’s sovereignty to address the issue of Somalis living under Kenyan rule.  This 
representative retorts: “The principle of self-determination which the Somali government 
adopts cannot be applied to free people living in an independent sovereign country.  
Kenya is a mixed society of which Somali and NFD are a part . . . . the Somalis in the 
NFD [Northern Federated District] have of their own accord thrown in their lot with the 
Kenya government by taking part in the elections in which six candidates have already 
been returned unopposed” (El-Ayouty 1976, 33-34).  Thus, Kenya makes the argument 
that, due to their participation in the political affairs of the state, these Somalis are firmly 
Kenyan citizens.  As is evident from the O.A.U. documents, favor was ultimately granted 
to Kenya’s argument, since it more closely aligned with the purpose of the O.A.U.  
Thompson and Zartman identify norms such as a nonintervention in internal affairs, the 
fixed nature of boundaries, and the desire for national independence and African unity as 
being the guiding principles of these meetings (El-Ayouty 1976, 4-5).  African states as 
independent political units were favored over the divisions that colonial-era borders often 
created between various ethnic groups.   
 Scholars have examined the effects these notions of stability have had on the 
perpetuation of colonial era borders.  Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg noted in an 
influential 1982 article that “No [African] country has disintegrated into smaller 
jurisdictions or been absorbed into a larger one against the wishes of its legitimate 
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government and as a result of violence or the threat of violence . . . . No African state has 
been divided as a result of internal warfare” (1982, 1).  They distinguish between an 
“empirical state,” one that has effective and legitimate control over its territory and a 
“juridical state,” one that is essentially given legitimacy by the international community.  
It appears that what may be termed a “government” can possess some empirical attributes 
(an example could be the authority Fatah holds in the West Bank), and yet still not be 
considered a state since it lacks the juridical decree of sovereignty.  The benefits of this 
juridical status is that “international society provides legal protection for member states 
from any powers, internal and external, that seek to intervene in, invade, encroach upon, 
or otherwise assault their sovereignty” (Jackson & Rosberg 1982, 13).  Furthermore, the 
international system imbues the sovereign state with what could be termed certain 
“natural rights,” such as autonomy over its own territory and the ability to enter into 
foreign relations.  Yet, the question still remains as to why African states persisted 
despite all the internal challenges they face from within.  
 Jackson and Rosberg identify factors that helped to maintain stability throughout 
Africa.  They point to: “the ideology of Pan-Africanism; the vulnerability of all states in 
the region and the insecurity of statesmen; the support of the larger international society, 
including particularly its institutions and associations; and the reluctance, to date, of non-
African powers to intervene in the affairs of African states without having been invited to 
do so by their governments” (1982, 17).  The ideology of Pan-Africanism was one of the 
motivating factors behind the formation of the O.A.U.  The common experience of 
colonialism united these African states and legitimized their newly independent status.  
Furthermore, the weakness of many states in Africa historically prevented cross-border 
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conflicts since each state was fearful of other nations usurping their authority within their 
territories.  African independence also accompanied a period in which international 
organizations were rapidly multiplying.  It became imperative for these African states to 
fully enter into the international community in order to achieve all of the benefits of 
statehood.  Finally, outside actors in the 20th century usually remained reluctant to 
interfere in internal struggles within sovereign nations.  Very rarely did outside powers 
overtly intervene in African countries.  Plus, the international community wished to 
respect the rules of harmony between African states that the O.A.U. had established.  For 
instance, the Soviet Union abandoned its longtime ally, Somalia, in 1977 when the 
Somali government invaded Ethiopian territory.  Thus, all of these factors combined to 
perpetuate “stability” in Africa throughout the 20th century (Jackson & Rosberg 1982, 17-
20). 
 Pierre Englebert offers further answers as to why stability was so prized 
throughout Africa in the 20th century.  Writing in 2009, he still sees rigidity in the borders 
of African states.  In addition, many states, with the exception of Sudan and a few others, 
have lacked any type of separatist movement within their borders.  He examines why 
Africa’s leaders refrain from any type of reorganization of these colonial borders.  
Englebert claims that “even when their financial resources dry up, states can still generate 
allegiance because their institutions and offices, widely distributed across their territories, 
continue to be the repositories of sovereignty.  Domestically, state sovereignty manifests 
itself through legal command, that is, the monopolistic capacity of the state to order 
people around through the law” (2009, 57).  Thus, it seems almost a “hierarchy” of power 
is established throughout African states.  Local rulers throughout an African nation grab 
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onto various offices and positions associated with the national governments.  They do this 
in order to, as Englebert characterizes it, “extract their own resources locally or to exert 
local domination” (2009, 57).  This construction of power plays into the international 
dimension of sovereignty as well.  Many African states have predicated their survival 
upon the recognition of their international sovereignty.  They have become dependent on 
the economic and security benefits that go along with international recognition, such as 
entry into organizations such as the United Nations and the ability to form treaties and 
seek redress for acts committed against them in international forums.  Were they to 
forego this, the existing power structures within these states would likely collapse.  And 
because, as Englebert demonstrates, power remains so widely diffused throughout the 
African state, few leaders would propose a move such as secession (2009, 95).  
Consequently, borders remain static and ethnic and religious tensions are allowed to 
simmer within these arbitrary yet established borders. 
 Jeffrey Herbst also studies the strong desire for stability throughout Africa.  In his 
estimation, most African leaders were extremely reluctant to change the colonial-era 
borders.  Once they had seized power in the cities, they were largely unwilling to upset 
precarious balances of power by disturbing the established, sovereign borders of their 
states.  Maintaining the borders gave these new African leaders a maximum amount of 
leniency to gain control over their new nations (Herbst 2000, 97). 
 Herbst also notes how rapidly the process of decolonization occurred.  He argues 
that the speed with which the colonial powers surrendered political authority to African 
leaders left little time for these new leaders to develop entirely new borders throughout 
the continent.  Thus, these new African nations acquiesced to the existing international 
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political norms.  The prevailing tides of international law issuing from Western 
institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund recognized only those nation-states that would have stable, “sovereign” borders.  
These institutions would not assist or provide aid to new African states if their borders 
proved to be unstable and mutable.  This combination of internal and external factors 
prevented African leaders from developing novel models of sovereignty for their newly 
independent nations in the early 1960’s (Herbst 2000, 103-106). 
 Once again, the doctrines of the O.A.U. intervened to promote stability 
throughout the region.  Herbst argues: “O.A.U. principles were designed to promote the 
rights of states rather than individuals” (2000, 106).  Therefore, the supremacy of the 
state and the maintenance of political order were upheld over individual political 
freedoms and rights.  Herbst suggests that little regard was shown for the delicate 
tensions that existed between various ethnic groups within these new nation-states.  All 
these matters were cast aside in order to create a political model of Africa that was based 
off of Western notions of state sovereignty and independence.  Herbst even goes so far as 
to term this process an “elimination of the right to self-determination” (2000, 107).  The 
process of crafting these new states did not necessarily include guarantees of minority 
rights.  Rather, power needed to be consolidated by these independent African leaders 
before their states could enjoy all of the benefits of being part of the international 
community.  It seems that the realities of the international system simply made it 
impossible for these leaders to consider new definitions of sovereignty in the wake of 
independence. 
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  Obviously, the O.A.U. norms of noninterference would not always be strictly 
enforced.  As will be shown in Sudan, outside nations often intervened—if merely 
covertly—in order to maintain stability.  Crucial to the role that the international 
community would later play in the Sudanese peace process is the formation of the 
African Union (A.U.) in 2002.  This organization became, in a sense, a revamped version 
of the O.A.U.  One of the key differences in the two institutions, however, came in the 
A.U.’s focus on African stability, even if preserving this stability meant encroaching on 
the stability of sovereign states.  Unlike the O.A.U.’s charter, the A.U. “explicitly 
recognizes the right to intervene in a member state on humanitarian and human rights 
grounds” (Hanson 2009).  Indeed, the A.U. has authorized several peacekeeping 
operations in nations such as Somalia, as well as in the Darfur region of Sudan (Hanson 
2009).  Perhaps the A.U.’s recognition of limits to state sovereignty leads the way to an 
acceptance of South Sudanese secession.   
  
Literature Review- Recognition of Ethnic Secessionist Movements 
 The role that international perceptions of ethnic divisions play comprises another 
theoretical dimension of this paper.  Obviously, ethnic divisions are sharp within Sudan.  
Through an appraisal of the concept of ethnicity, insights are gleaned on the unique 
situation existing in the South Sudan.  In particular, it was the imposition of an Arab, 
Islamic identity by the government in Khartoum that caused decades of alienation among 
many Sudanese living in the South who primarily thought of themselves as African and 
either Christian or belonging to traditional African religions.  International perceptions of 
ethnicity perhaps explain why secession was ultimately the inevitable result of the 
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tensions in Sudan, but it should be questioned whether or not ethnic dimensions played a 
role in South Sudan’s recognition by the international community. 
 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr provide a comprehensive theoretical 
background for the concept of ethnicity and ethnic conflict.  They characterize ethnic 
conflicts as “a manifestation of the enduring tension between states that want to 
consolidate and expand their power and ethnic groups that want to defend and promote 
their collective identity and interests” (2004, 17).  They see a tension between the legal 
recognition of a state by the international community (which confers upon a state almost 
the status of personhood) and the various ethnic minorities that comprise the populations 
of these states.  Furthermore, the international legal recognition for ethnic groups often 
pales in comparison to that afforded to states.  Harff and Gurr characterize this as 
“groups, thus, have no legally recognized independent status apart from individuals or 
states” (2004, 179).   
 Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly also study the theoretical frameworks of 
ethnic identity and ethnic conflict.  Particularly relevant to this discussion is their framing 
of the issue of ethnosecessionist movements.  They argue that, in the past, the 
international community rarely heeded arguments for secession by various ethnic groups, 
but that these calls are being listened to with a greater frequency today.  In particular, 
they demonstrate that a secessionist movement, in the eyes of others becomes “more 
worthy of international support the most at-risk a minority is, the more serious its 
grievances are, and the more realistic, flexible, and accommodating its demands have 
been over time” (Taras & Ganguly 2002, 54).  However, these standards are hardly 
universalized across different ethnic groups struggling against governments that they 
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deem as either intolerable or not representative of their culture and heritage.  Often, the 
grievances of an ethnic group coalesce around an important political right—the right of 
self-determination.  Calls for self-representation by ethnic groups are extremely common 
in the international community (Taras & Ganguly 2002, 54).   
 Taras and Ganguly suggest that there may be a list of criteria the international 
community uses when deciding whether or not to recognize an entity. They engage the 
work of a political philosopher, Allen Buchanan, who identifies which cases of ethnic 
secessionism may be more likely to receive international attention (Taras & Ganguly 
2002, 58).  Basing their arguments off of Buchanan’s theories of recognition, Taras and 
Ganguly identify twelve “cases” in which secession might be deemed permissible by the 
international community:  
the defense of liberty; the promotion of diversity; in order to safeguard liberalism, 
it is in the interest of a liberal state to permit illiberal groups to secede; when the 
original goals for setting up a political union have become obsolete or irrelevant; 
when the right of secession is included in a constitution in order to attract new 
members, and at some later date a member reconsiders its entry decision;  
escaping discriminatory redistribution at the hands of the existing state; the 
principle of Pareto optimality (if one person benefits and no one else loses 
anything, then it is justified); notion that every people is entitled to have its own 
state; preservation of a culture; self-defense; rectification of past injustices; and 
the disappearance of the fair play of the liberal system (2002, 59-63).   
This is an extensive of list of circumstances, and it is certain that not every scholar of 
ethnic conflict and separatism would necessarily agree with them.  However, it provides a 
holistic framework for judging why the international community judges some 
secessionist movements as legitimate while others are merely stuck in a holding pattern, 
waiting for international recognition.  These criteria are tempting to apply to the situation 
of South Sudan, but do they really provide the linchpin for the international community’s 
support of recognition? 
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Literature Review- Geopolitics 
Finally, the role that the independent variable of geopolitics plays is examined to 
determine the interests the international community had in preserving peace throughout 
Sudan and Africa at large.  Since countries such as the United States had an integral role 
in preparing and negotiating the CPA, it is likely they were interested in seeing a peaceful 
Sudan.  This section explains historical geopolitical attitudes toward intervention in 
Africa.  Using this section and the case study of Sudan, it will be determined just how the 
international community came to see South Sudanese secession as inevitable to a stable 
Africa.       
Herbst notes how African nations faced international pressure to preserve their 
borders.  For example, superpowers such as the United States pledged that they would not 
lend support to secessionist groups within Africa (2000, 108).  It was a cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign policy to maintain the status quo in Africa in order to prevent chaos and 
disunity throughout the region.  Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. involved themselves in 
any conflicts over disputed borders in Africa.  African stability would become even 
further codified through decisions of the International Court of Justice, which declared in 
a border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso that “because African states had decided 
to retain the colonial boundaries, the practices of the region must be respected despite the 
apparent conflict with the principle of the right to self-determination” (Herbst 2000, 109).   
Additionally, the international community often recognized official “authority” as 
residing within the traditional, colonial-era capitol cities of each country.  This was 
largely a result of the urbanized majority of the African independence movement as was 
previously noted, but it also stemmed out of a desire from the great powers of the world 
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to confer a degree of stability onto the continent by recognizing the African governments 
that replaced the colonial governments.  Thus, as Herbst argues, ultimately the 
“international system allowed leaders to have full legal control of the territories that were 
within their borders” (2000, 135).  This would have a profound effect on the concept of 
legal command that Englebert noted; African leaders would gradually create inertia by 
deriving more and more power from the international community that recognized their 
states as sovereign. 
 
Review of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 As stated at the outset, this thesis is concerned with examining the influence of 
African stability, ethnic secessionism, and geopolitical forces on the recognition of South 
Sudan.  Key to these dependent variables are the doctrines of African territorial integrity 
and noninterference codified by the O.A.U., the scant record of international recognition 
for purely ethnic secessionist movements, and foreign policies of states such as the U.S. 
that avoided any intrusion into African border disputes.  The full history of Sudan is yet 
to be detailed in this study, but some preliminary assertions can be made about the role 
these variables might play.   
 First, the influence of African stability may or may not be shown in the case of 
South Sudan.  It is apparent that inter-state stability in Africa throughout the 20th century 
largely meant maintaining colonial era borders.  South Sudan represents a departure from 
this model.  Pertinent to this study, however, is how radical a departure this case study 
actually is.  Could the maintenance of inter-state stability only have come through a 
partitioning of Sudan?  The A.U.’s evolving doctrines perhaps lend credence to this 
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claim.  Sovereignty and traditional borders may have been expendable as long as 
secession would lead to greater African stability. 
 Next, judgment will come on whether or not international perceptions of ethnic 
conflict played a role in the international recognition of South Sudan.  Sudan is certainly 
rife with ethnic conflict; this fact is not in dispute.  However, did South Sudan’s 
recognition come about because the international community wished to confer autonomy 
and self-determination upon the long-oppressed peoples of the South?  The skeptical eye 
cast by Taras and Ganguly on international recognition of ethnosecessionist movements 
may suggest an answer to this inquiry.   
 Finally, the international community, in particular the United States, long opposed 
recognizing African secessionist conflicts.  As Herbst demonstrated, these outside powers 
desired stability throughout Africa, and were unwilling to lend support to movements that 
might upset this balance.  However, considering the crucial role the U.S. and other 
nations such as Norway played in the peace process in Sudan, as well as in countries such 
as Somalia, might signal a shift.  Could it be that the international community supported 
South Sudanese secession because of the crucial role they played in the Sudanese peace 
process?   
 
Hypotheses 
 What can be expected if these independent variables do end up playing a role in 
determining the CPA and international recognition of South Sudan?  First of all, if the 
maintenance of stability in Africa plays a role, then it should be apparent that the 
longstanding Sudanese crisis presented a threat to the original O.A.U. mandate of African 
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stability.  The intervention of African nations in the peace processes would be evidence 
of this assertion.  Next, if some notion of ethnic secessionism played a role, it would be 
expected that the international community would recognize South Sudan on the basis of 
ethnic identity.  Finally, if geopolitics was a factor, it will be determined that countries 




Sudan: Historical Background 
 
Francis M. Deng provides an exhaustive study of the history of Sudan and how its 
ethnic divisions have caused conflict and strife ever since Sudan declared its 
independence in 1956.  At the center of this conflict, as Deng writes, is that “the 
historical process that has separated the Arab Muslim North and the African South has its 
roots in the Arabization and Islamization of the North and in the resistance to those forces 
in the South.  The assimilation processes favored the Arab religion and culture over 
African race, religions, and cultures, which remained prevalent in the South” (1995, 9).  
The strands of this Northern hegemony go back to the days of Sudan’s administration as 
a colony of Great Britain.  The British put greater stock into the success of the North, 
thus leaving the South mostly to survive on its own in a premodern existence.  The 
British merely wanted to keep order in the South; they were not interested in establishing 
a fully functioning political society there (Deng 1995, 11).  Thus, the North was primed 
to assert its dominion over the South when the country finally gained its independence.  
And the assertion of Northern hegemony began in earnest almost immediately upon 
Sudan’s birth as a sovereign nation.  In order to successfully implement the strategies of 
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Arabization and Islamization in the South, the Sudanese military began to occupy that 
territory in 1958.  This only further inflamed tensions between the two regions of the 
country, which led to the commencement of a long and bloody civil war in the 1960s 
(Deng 1995, 12).  
  
Southern Autonomy and Aftermath 
 
When the government of Jaafar Muhammad Numeiri came to power in Khartoum 
in 1969, tensions eased between the North and the South.  This led to an historic 
agreement in 1972 to give the south Sudan a sense of autonomy.  While not fully 
independent, it could be said that the south Sudanese now possessed some degree of self-
determination.  This historic agreement established a self-governing, autonomous area in 
the south.  Numeiri allowed Ethiopia to not only be the host of these peace talks but for 
its leader, Emperor Haile Selassie, to play the role of mediator.  Selassie’s level of clout 
within the continent’s political system allowed him to play an active role in the talks, 
something that Iyob and Khadiagala note was an unprecedented move in the resolution of 
African political crises (2006, 85).  Ethiopia had clear motives for seeing a resolution to 
the Sudanese crisis as “facing Eritrean secessionism, it was useful for Haile Selassie to 
support a peaceful resolution of the Sudan conflict within the context of unity and 
inherited boundaries” (2006, 85).  Thus, talks of secession were unofficially deemed off 
the table as far as Ethiopia was concerned. 
 These talks eventually led to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement.  This is the treaty 
that allowed the south to form the Southern Regional Government, which was the 
autonomous southern government.  Obviously, this was not true secession, but rather the 
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granting of certain southern demands in order to curb demands for a breakaway state.  In 
several crucial ways, the Southern Regional Government remained reliant on the 
Khartoum government for necessary resources, such as the allocation of tax revenues.  
The Ababa Agreement also provided for conditions such as an amnesty program for 
rebels who wished to join the Southern Defence Corps, an amalgamation of northern and 
southern troops that would preserve order throughout the south.  Despite the fragile 
nature of this autonomy, the south did enjoy a period when it had the ability to shape 
some of its own affairs.   
However, tensions were bound to create a conflict in the future.  Peter Nyaba 
argues that the system implemented under the Ababa Agreement was one in which “the 
south became a sub-system of the Numeiri regime . . . an island of liberal democracy in 
an ocean of one party dictatorship and the personal rule of Numeiri . . . which lacked or 
was denied the economic power and resources to develop the region” (Iyob & Khadiagala 
2006, 86).  Additionally, political and ethnic tensions within the new southern leadership 
allowed Numeiri to covertly curry favor with certain elements of the resistance and 
ultimately diminish the “true” autonomy of the southern region.  A variety of factors, 
prominent among them the discovery of oil in the Upper Nile region of Sudan, led 
Numeiri to dissolve the Southern Regional Government in 1981 and to abandon many of 
the tenets of the Ababa agreement (Iybo & Khadiagala 2006, 86-88).  As explained 
previously, these are the events that led to the birth of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983. 
However, Numeiri’s decision eventually came back to haunt him.  Various 
conservative Islamic groups were not pleased with Numeiri’s apparent “partitioning” of 
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Sudan.  Furthermore, he also deepened his own personal Islamic faith and soon became 
weary of the uneasy alliance between an authoritarian state in the North and a liberal 
democracy existing in the South’s new autonomous region.  Thus, Numeiri imposed 
reforms to slowly chip away at the South’s autonomy.  In particular, he strove to impose 
shari’a law throughout the country.  The South responded by forming the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.  The goal of this 
movement was “the creation of a new, secular, democratic, and pluralistic Sudan” (Deng 
1995, 13).  During the 1980’s and 1990’s, the war became increasingly bloody and tragic, 
claiming the lives of many Sudanese through violence and famine.  The taking of power 
by General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir in 1989 only further exacerbated the tensions 
between the North and the South.  Bashir strove to make Islam even more central to the 
conception of a “Sudanese identity,” and thus tensions continue to this day, even with the 
secession of the South (Deng 1995, 11-13). 
The dissolution of the southern autonomous region brought with it a continuation 
of the civil war that had festered in Sudan since independence.  Nevertheless, the Ababa 
Agreement and its aftermath had established a precedence that would not be broken in 
Sudan: the intervention of external powers in Sudanese affairs.  It is apparent that 
members of the international community inexorably linked themselves with the situation 
in Sudan: 
 The Addis Ababa Agreement drew regional and international actors into the  
 conflict, helping to further rupture the walls of sovereignty that had shielded the  
 conflict from outsiders.  The roles of external actors as mediators and providers of 
 diverse resources multiplied as geopolitical shifts in alliances affected the course 
 of the conflict.  External participation in the conflict presented numerous vistas  
 and constraints to the Sudanese parties, at once offering resources to parties to  
 strengthen their organizational capacity, but at [the] same time subjecting them to 
 the vagaries of external dependence. (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 91) 
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The ascension of General Omar al-Bashir and his Islamists to power through a coup in 
1989 would only serve to increase the level of international mediation in Sudan.   
In the early 1990’s, old alliances of both the Sudanese government and the 
SPLM/A began to shift and break down.  Bashir sought to move his government toward a 
more anti-American standpoint by strengthening relations with nations such as Libya and 
Iran.  This consequently led to Bashir losing support among fellow Arab states such as 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.  Political change in Ethiopia 
also led to the cessation of Ethiopian assistance to the rebel forces.  The Bashir 
government took advantage of these weaknesses in the SPLM/A in order to reverse many 
of the military gains the rebel force had gained in the past decade.  A turning point came 
with Bashir’s turning to Nigeria’s president, Ibrahim Babangida, who was then the 
chairman of the O.A.U., to help Sudan resume peace talks with the SPLM/A (Iyob & 
Khadiagala 2006, 94).   
 Both sides saw something to gain in these talks, which came to be known as the 
Abuja peace talks of 1992 and 1993.  Bashir’s government saw Nigeria as an effective 
African power that would help to counterbalance any type of external meddling in 
Sudanese affairs, whereas the SPLM/A viewed this as a potential chance to galvanize 
African support for their cause and against the Bashir government.  Additionally, the 
Nigerians’ experience with their own civil war gave them some clout in negotiating an 
ending to a seemingly intractable political conflict.  Although the talks led to 
commitments by both sides to respect the diverse nature of Sudanese society, issues of 
great substance were largely ignored.  Nigeria would try once more to get the two sides 
together, even going so far as to involve Kenya and Uganda, but saw its efforts become 
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largely fruitless as the Bashir government consolidated its power through reversals of 
previous SPLM/A victories.  As the humanitarian crisis worsened throughout the south, 
the United States sought to once again pressure the Bashir government to accept certain 
limitations on sovereignty in order to save lives of southern civilians.  Although Sudan 
acceded to the continuation of aid to these civilians, they dismissed the creation of United 
Nations-monitored “safe zones” for citizens to live in and find shelter from the fighting 
between the Sudanese government and the rebel forces (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 94-96). 
 These conditions would cause Sudan and the international community to engage 
in talks that would eventually lead to the CPA.  However, this period had clearly 
established a precedent for external action taken inside of a sovereign African nation.  
O.A.U. notions of nonintervention were challenged as “most of the post-independence 
[African] governments invoked the norms of sovereignty in keeping outsiders from these 
debates, but since national questions remained open and violently contested, regional and 
international actors found intervention opportunities” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 97).  
Additionally, forces in both the north and the south became increasingly dependent on the 
benefits conferred upon them by external actors.  All of this slowly led to the situation 
that existed in the early-1990’s: many members of the international community had a 
clear stake in seeing the conflict in Sudan resolved.  The negotiations surrounding the 
formation of the CPA would further entrench the international community in a debate 
over the secession of the south. 
 
Creation of CPA 
 
After years of violent struggle, hope came for the Sudanese in the form of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  A series of documents that were signed between 2002 
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and 2005, the CPA laid the groundwork for the secession of the South in 2011.  The issue 
of a peace settlement was especially pertinent at this time because of the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.  Crucially, the CPA included an 
agreement for a cease-fire between the Sudanese military and the SPLM/A.  The 
conditions of the agreements were that “both the North and South were to maintain 
separate armed forces, the 91,000 northern troops in the South were to be withdrawn 
within two and a half years, and the SPLA was to retire its forces from the North within 
the next eight months” (Collins 2008, 269).  Wealth sharing of oil revenues was also 
addressed in these agreements by splitting the profits between the Northern and Southern 
governments (Collins 2008, 268-269). 
 However, the most important components of the CPA for this discussion are the 
power-sharing deals that were implemented.  The CPA declared: “during a six-year 
interim period southern Sudan would be governed by the autonomous Government of 
South Sudan (GoSS), at the end of which time a referendum would be held, in 2011, 
supervised by international monitors.  In it the southern Sudanese would decide either to 
remain an autonomous province in a unified Sudan or to become an independent 
republic” (Collins 2008, 269).  Finally, to settle the issue of shari’a law, it was decreed 
that non-Muslims would not be held liable for the statues unique to Islamic law (Collins 
2008, 269).  
To understand how Sudan and the international community arrived at the CPA, it 
is necessary to detail the peace process leading to the agreements contained within it.  
The early 1990’s were a period of growing international isolation for the Bashir 
government.  In 1993, the United States urged the implementation of sanctions against 
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Sudan for its flagrant abuses of human rights and its connections to radical Islam and 
terrorism.  These last two points were especially relevant in light of the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombings, of which Sudan, it was argued, was complicit in.  I.M.F. 
expulsion and Arab League pressure on the Sudanese government followed United States 
distancing from Bashir’s regime.  It soon became clear that “mounting external pressure 
compounded an economy reeling under the strain of war, decreased agricultural 
production, soaring inflation, and high unemployment” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 103).  
It was clear to Bashir that the current trajectory for Sudan was unsustainable, and thus 
some kind of mediation was needed to reduce the crippling effects of Sudan’s 
international isolation. 
 This led Bashir to seek the aid of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), a body of several African states.  Bashir saw IGAD intervention 
as preferable to intervention by external powers such as the United States.  IGAD 
accepted the task because it viewed the Sudanese civil war as a threat to stability in 
Africa, especially since problems such as refugees were beginning to affect neighboring 
countries in profound ways.  September 1993 brought the Addis Ababa summit, which 
was the first round of these peace talks.  This meeting established “a four-nation 
mediation committee composed of Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi, Eritrean president 
Issaias Afewerki, Ethiopian president Meles Zenawi, and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni.  A 
ministerial committee from the four nations was later designated to lead the mediation 
under Moi’s chairmanship” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 104).  Simultaneously, U.S. 
mediators successfully reconciled the SPLA with other rebel divisions throughout the 
south in order to give the south Sudanese a more coherent voice in any potential 
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negotiations.  This union was consolidated in the Washington Declaration of October 
1993, which united southern factions in opposition against northern hegemony (Iyob & 
Khadiagala 2006, 101-104). 
Bashir would return to IGAD negotiations in July 1997, but the United States 
swiftly implemented a series of increasingly coercive sanctions against Sudan.  This was 
due in part to the fact that the U.S. did not believe the IGAD talks would result in any 
tangible solutions.  Containing Sudan remained the principle objective of the U.S. and its 
African allies of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda.  Some relief would come to Bashir’s 
government, however, when in October 1997, Egypt began a process of reconciliation 
with Sudan.  In part, Egypt undertook this initiative due to its concern over instability on 
its southern border.  After uniting with Libya, Egypt essentially tried to impose a counter-
IGAD peace process.  Instead of isolating Egypt’s efforts, IGAD agreed to open a new 
round of negotiations in May 1998 with several other representatives of countries and 
Kofi Annan present.  However, as in the past, these talks led to little tangible solutions 
(Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 110-112). 
 U.S. relations with Sudan would reach a new low in August 1998 when the U.S. 
struck a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan due to suspected Sudanese involvement in the 
production of chemical weapons as well as the government’s potential ties to Osama bin 
Laden.  In response, the U.S. was called upon to increase its commitment to the peace 
process; instead of bombing Sudanese government assets, the Clinton administration was 
persuaded that working with IGAD and the Sudanese government would foster a more 
stable situation in Sudan.  However, this coincided with an increased Sudanese 
relationship with the Egyptian and Libyan governments, and Bashir favored working 
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through their initiatives rather than trying to go through IGAD and the United States.  
Naturally, the United States was not supportive of Libya’s involvement in the peace 
process, so peace talks would be stalled yet again (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 112-115). 
 In response to these tensions, IGAD aggressively sought to bolster its credibility 
in the negotiating process by undergoing a professionalization of its position in the 
Sudanese negotiations.  The United States and the SPLA began to warm to the Egyptian-
Libyan plan as well, essentially seeing no other way around Bashir’s intransigence but to 
try to accommodate the two different sets of peace negotiations.  John Garang, the leader 
of the SPLA noted in a 2000 visit to Cairo: “the SPLM believes these two initiatives must 
be coordinated or merged in order to achieve a solution that can neither be accused of 
being predominantly African (IGAD) nor principally Arab (the Egyptian-Libyan 
proposals)” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 117).  He essentially urged a merging of the two 
different peace plans being offered.  However, a true merger would not come swiftly, as 
Egypt resisted calls of any kind of self-determination for south Sudan.  As a result, 
IGAD’s peace plan was in danger while the Egyptian plan was only bolstered (Iyob & 
Khadiagala 2006, 116-119). 
The Machakos Protocol signaled the way toward unity between the two regions of 
Sudan.  Unlike previous agreements, the Machakos Protocol brought the two sides into 
agreement on two key tenets: 
 First, the SPLA agreed that sharia would remain the source of legislation in the  
 North, while the south would be governed by a secular administration.  Second,  
 Khartoum accepted an internationally monitored referendum that would be held  
 after a transition period of six and a half years, in which the south would decide  
 whether to secede or continue to exist within a united federal Sudan. (Iyob & 
 Khadiagala 2006, 121-122) 
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This was only the first step toward a wide-ranging peace initiative, even in the midst of 
renewed hostilities between the north and south.  Key to this agreement was the provision 
on the internationally monitored referendum, which was insisted upon by the SPLM/A as 
a condition for them signing the Machakos Protocol.  October 2002 brought with it a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities, which called for an end to 
fighting in all areas of Sudan.  This agreement also created a muti-national Verification 
and Monitoring Team that would report on the progress of the cessation of hostilities.  
Further talks were had on security and economic issues, as well as what the political 
composition of a future united Sudan might look like.  The United States urged the 
creation of a special Security Council session to be held in Nairobi in order to finalize the 
peace agreements between the north and the south.  The IGAD peace process was 
considered to be complete when, in January 2005, these agreements were united into one 
document and both sides signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
 However, it seems that, at least by 2010, international actors and the Sudanese 
themselves viewed secession as inevitable.  Important to keep in mind is that, through the 
referendum contained within, the CPA essentially made secession inevitable.  As the 
CPA failed to be implemented, countries such as the United States came to view 
secession as the only option to securing any semblance of peace.  Johnnie Carson, the 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, noted in a March 2011 talk: “a delay 
in the referendum would have seriously jeopardized the entire CPA and potentially have 
condemned Sudan to more conflict and instability . . . a referendum that lacked credibility 
and international recognition would have greatly eroded the willingness of all parties to 
abide by the terms of the CPA (Carson 2011, 2).  If South Sudan and Sudan do not 
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initiate hostilities against one another, it is likely that it could be said that “peace” has 
been achieved, at least between two different factions.  However, if a war is started, 
perhaps the costs of South Sudan’s secession will be made clear.   
 
 
Independent Variable: Stability  
 The intervention of IGAD in the early 1990s is demonstrative of the fact that 
African nations prized stability in the Sudan, even if it meant encroaching on Sudan’s 
sovereignty.  The 1993 Addis Ababa summit, with its quartet of African leaders at the 
helm established the type of precedent that would eventually lead to the mandate of the 
A.U., which still viewed stability as of preeminent concern in Africa.  As detailed 
previously Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda all played integral roles along with the U.S. in 
trying to negotiate a settlement to the longstanding Sudanese civil war.  Egypt’s desire to 
offer a counter-peace plan does not refute the argument that other African nations desired 
stability throughout Africa.   
 African intervention in Sudan was certainly not unique to the peace process 
either.  A.U. peacekeepers had been sent into the Darfur region of Sudan to monitor a 
ceasefire in 2004.  However, it was quickly deemed that this A.U. peacekeeping force 
was too meager and ineffective to effectively monitor a ceasefire, especially after an A.U. 
peacekeeper was killed.  Thus, the level of African commitment to stability is open to 
question (Cockett 2010, 212-213).  Perhaps African nations will commit to declarations 
of peace but are more reluctant to sign onto operations that require the utilization of 
military resources in order to achieve stability.  This may be proven by the fact that the 
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A.U. soon began calling for U.N. peacekeepers to intervene in Darfur after A.U. 
casualties were reported there (Cockett 2010, 212-213).    
 
 
Independent Variable: Ethnic Secessionism 
 
 Taras and Ganguly open up the possibility that ethnosecessionist movements may 
become more accepted in the modern era.  In particular, they cite the work of a scholar, 
Buchheit, who argued in the 1970’s that international law was developing in a direction 
that would favor secessionist movements.  He arrived at the following conclusion 
regarding the viability of a secessionist movement on the world stage: 
Where the disruption factor is high, the claimant must make out an extraordinarily 
 good case for its entitlement to self-determination.  In other words, the higher the  
 disruption factor, the more will be required by way of demonstrating selfness and 
 future viability.  Where little disruption is liable to ensue from the secession, or 
 where the amount of current disruption outweighs the future risk, the community 
 can afford to be less strict in its requirements for selfhood . . . . It may therefore  
 accommodate to a greater extent the self-governing wishes of a particular people 
 who cannot offer overwhelming proof of their racial, historical, or linguistic  
 distinctness. (Taras & Ganguly 2002, 55-56) 
Buchheit’s theory is appealing, and Taras and Ganguly do not entirely discount it.  
However, they also argue that outside actors are often hesitant to intervene in secessionist 
crises and that these actors tend to overestimate the amount of damage a successful 
secession could potentially inflict on the global community.   
Still, scholars have been quick to try to place regulations on when the 
international community should impose and try to aid a secessionist movement.  
According to Amitai Etzioni, it is “only when secessionist movements seek to break out 
of empires—and only when those empires refuse to democratize—does self-
determination deserve our support.  Otherwise, democratic government and community 
building, not fragmentation, should be accorded the highest standing” (Taras & Ganguly 
 Knox 35
2002, 57-58).  Thus, it is not always in the national interests of superpowers such as the 
United States, European Union, or even the United Nations to recognize separatist 
movements as legitimate.  In the eyes of these powerful members of the world 
community, sometimes all that is needed is an increased level of democratization in these 
nations.  Perhaps then, the international community remains willing only to support 
secessionist movements that work against the most despotic and authoritarian of regimes.   
 Toensing and Ufheil-Somers argue that, because of certain aspects of the CPA, 
southern secession was inevitable.  Even though the CPA brought about provisions for 
the southern government to be brought into the federal government of Khartoum, this did 
not assuage the people of the south, who resorted to violent protest against symbols of the 
Khartoum government, especially after the death of Garang.  Additionally, the Sudanese 
government would soon find itself facing international castigation once again after the 
CPA was signed.  The Darfur crisis only served to further delegitimize the Bashir 
government in the eyes of the international community and, crucially, the southern 
Sudanese.  This led to further pressure on countries such as the United States to pursue 
punitive measures against the Sudanese government.  Activists for the Sudanese people 
within the United States called for, among other things “targeted sanctions against 
officials of Bashir's regime, an arms embargo on the government, a suspension of debt 
relief, arming the SPLM and other measures to support the south more boldly” (Toensing 
& Ufheil-Somers 2010, 13).  Tremendous pressure existed within the U.S. for the 
government to rush to the side of the people of south Sudan. 
 Darfur proved to be a decisive turning point in the U.S.’s support for the southern 
rebels.  As domestic pressure grew in the United States for some international remedy for 
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the genocide, the Bush administration canceled any concessions it was willing to make to 
Bashir’s government in the peace process.  This shift in U.S. sympathies away from 
Bashir’s regime left many in Khartoum cynical toward the entire peace process.  Richard 
Cockett notes: “The Sudanese virtually broke off any reasonable co-operation with the 
West over the south, Darfur, or anywhere else.  Instead, they cultivated a sense of 
betrayal and suspicion” (Cockett 2010, 242).  The Darfur crisis made it virtually 
impossible for the United States to play the role of an impartial broker and monitor of the 
peace process.   
 
Independent Variable: Geopolitics 
 
To begin to understand the successful secession and recognition of South Sudan, 
it is essential to identify the role of countries such as the United States in crafting the 
CPA.  Specifically, determining the level of participation by the international community 
is crucial in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to why recognition was 
conferred upon South Sudan so swiftly.  What were the stakes that countries such as the 
United States and African Union members invested in ending the decades-long civil war 
in Sudan?  The international community played a crucial role in bringing the civil war in 
Sudan to a close, and thus bringing about the secession of South Sudan.   
 First the role that the world played in negotiating a truce in Sudan before the CPA 
was negotiated and finalized requires identification.  Under examination is the fact that, 
despite the explicated notions of sovereignty identified earlier in this paper, the 
international community was often willing to bypass the rules established by the United 
Nations and the O.A.U. in the case of Sudan.  Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala in 
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particular identify how Sudan’s African neighbors began to play a crucial role in the 
conflict.  For example, the newly formed political movement, the South Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SSLM), was given explicit regional support in the late 1960’s and 1970’s in 
its struggle against the government in Khartoum.  The Numeiri government in particular 
sowed discontent among several regional actors and led many of them to support the 
rebel movement (Iyob &Khadiagala 2006, 84-85).   
 The conclusion of a civil war in the Congo brought a fresh supply of arms to the 
Sudanese rebels.  Additionally, the ascent of Idi Amin in Uganda brought with it further 
good fortune for the SSLM.  Amin was supportive of the rebels in Sudan and thus 
allowed the SSLM to “transit supplies through Uganda and to conduct their activities 
from the Ugandan border areas” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 84).  Ironically, the Sudanese 
government had been a major supporter of secessionist elements throughout Eritrea.  
Accordingly, Ethiopia was willing to provide the SSLM with tangible military benefits to 
check the influence of the Sudanese government.   
The Numeiri government also antagonized Israel in its support of both Libya and 
Egypt, which led to supplies of Israeli arms being delivered to the rebels.  Iyob and 
Khadiagala identify that “by the time Numeiri signed agreements with Idi Amin and 
Haile Selassie in 1972 to reduce Ugandan and Ethiopian support for Anyanya [the 
Anyanya High Council, which was the governing instrument of the SSLM], and Western 
countries had started to draw closer to Numeiri after his break with the communists, 
Anyanya had built a credible military and political organization that made a difference in 
the bargaining with the north” (2006, 84-85).  Thus, in the forthcoming peace talks with 
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the north, the south had tremendous leverage with its newly formed legitimacy as a 
potentially autonomous governing unit. 
From an international dimension, perhaps the most crucial development during 
this time period was the establishment of ties between the Sudanese and United States 
governments.  Ethiopia had undergone a revolution in 1974 that brought the Marxist 
Mengistu Haile Mariam to power.  Therefore, the United States realized that “Sudan had 
become the major regional counterweight to Soviet encroachment in the Horn of Africa” 
(Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 87).  U.S. military and economic aid was endowed to the 
Numeiri government under the Reagan administration in the early 1980’s in order to 
bolster this counterweight to Soviet expansionism.  In turn, Ethiopia looked to southern 
rebel leaders as potential allies on the continent against Numeiri’s government.  The 
dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement can in part be attributed to the activities of 
certain rebel elements that were given free reign to carry out their activities in Ethiopia 
(Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 87-88). 
In particular, humanitarian concerns brought actors such as the United States back 
to the forefront of negotiating an agreement between Bashir’s government and the 
SPLM/A.  Both the government and the SPLM/A supported United Nations initiatives 
such as Operation Lifeline Sudan in order to bring much-needed supplies into southern 
areas affected by famine.  The U.S. played perhaps its most active role yet in the conflict 
when it sent Jimmy Carter in 1989 to negotiate a peaceful solution to the civil war.  Talks 
were held in Nairobi, Kenya, but they failed to produce anything tangible, as solutions 
could not be reached on “the government’s insistence on exemption of the south from 
some, but not all, Islamic laws in a federal system and the SPLM/A insistence on a 
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secular and broad-based national unity government” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 92).  
However, this did not dissuade the United States from asserting its newfound role as a 
prominent negotiator in the Sudanese conflict. 
 Despite Bashir’s agreement to utilize IGAD as a means for preventing 
encroachment on Sudanese sovereignty by non-African nations, Western nations 
established a new group in 1994 called the Friends of IGAD (also referred to as the 
IGAD Partners Forum).  This brought the United States and various European nations in 
close contact with the negotiations currently being mediated by IGAD.  Talks would 
break down in September 1994, which only served to further isolate Khartoum.  
Consequently, the United States would play its most active role yet in the conflict, as “the 
Clinton administration led . . . the Frontline States strategy, which entailed expanding 
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Sudan and strengthening the military 
capability of regional states to meet the escalation of the civil war” (Iyob & Khadiagala 
2006, 107).  States such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda signed on to this initiative and 
were rewarded with aid from the United States.  In January 1996, the United Nations 
Security Council passed Resolution 1044, which essentially called Sudan a threat to 
stability in Africa.  The resolution implored Sudan to abide by O.A.U. guidelines on 
supporting and harboring terroristic elements within its borders, something that Sudan 
had long been alleged of doing (U.N.S.C. Res. 1044).   
In 2001, the U.S. position toward Khartoum softened a bit, and the disparate 
elements throughout south Sudan sought greater unity among themselves.  At this point, 
oil revenues had bolstered Khartoum’s power, and thus a military defeat of the SPLA was 
deemed imminent.  There were calls on the United States, Norway, and Britain in 
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particular to step up their involvement in the Sudanese peace process.  After the attacks 
of September 11th, 2001, Bashir sought to distance himself from terrorist elements so as 
not to draw further rancor from Washington.  Thus, the Bush administration signaled that 
it was ready to improve its relations with the Sudanese government.  This was 
symbolized by the appointing of special envoy John Danforth to Sudan.  Danforth 
brought several proposals for peace in Sudan, and a group of international actors 
persuaded both sides to sign the Machakos Protocol in July 2002, which followed his 
renewed efforts at peace (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 120-122). 
The negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had included an intense 
level of participation of outside actors, including the United States.  The international 
community and even its own Congress put the U.S. in the position of mediator for a 
possible peace agreement.  After 9/11 Bashir tried to normalize relations with the United 
States, fearing that the U.S. would take punitive measures against his regime (Carney 
2007, 5).  This even went so far as Bashir’s government in cooperating with U.S. 
personnel to capture suspected al-Qaeda suspects in Sudan (Schumann 2010, 104-105).  
However, pressure was already building for the U.S. to support the rebels in the south.  
The United States Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, which “required the 
president to certify in six months that both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A 
were negotiating for peace in good faith.   If he could not do so, the United States had to 
seek UN and financial institutions’ sanctions and limited access to oil reserves” (Carney 
2007, 5).  Timothy Carney argues that this law was viewed as threatening to the Bashir 
regime, and it may have set the tone of negotiations as they started in 2002 (Carney 2007, 
5).   
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 This largely concluded the negotiations themselves between the two sides as far 
as a formal peace agreement.  What the end of the CPA process had demonstrated was 
the integral role that outside actors, some of them non-African, had played in the process.  
The various nations and international organizations that had participated in the peace 
process had often worked at cross-purposes to defend their own interests in the African 
region.  Nor did the CPA necessarily settle questions of whether the level of external 
influence was appropriate to solve this seemingly intractable conflict.  Peter Woodward 
worried that “perhaps the whole process was one imposed on Sudan by the international 
community, and especially the USA.  The danger might lie in the parties feeling a lack of 
ownership of the agreement, and with the international community turned away, one or 
other of the signatories might seek to disown aspects of it and pursue a different course of 
action” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, 125).  Thus, the role of external actors in African 
affairs was not yet definitively established.  The conclusion of the CPA in and of itself 
did not necessarily symbolize a new paradigm in outside states successfully intervening 
in sovereign African nations. 
      
Assessments 
 Going back to the principles of African stability and nonintervention laid out by 
the O.A.U., it seems that the initial peace processes, especially those in the 1970’s, tried 
to respect those principles.  The reason the Sudanese government turned to brokers such 
as fellow African countries was to avoid incursion by outside powers such as the United 
States.  The African-peace processes in particular seem to be sacrifices by Sudan of some 
of its territorial integrity to other African nations in exchange for noninterference by 
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other states.  It seems that initiatives such as the southern autonomous region of the early 
1970s were designed to preserve the inherent “order” of the African continent.  They 
were attempts to mediate between maintaining the legitimacy of African territorial 
integrity and addressing the unavoidable grievances of a population.  The goals of the 
A.U. do differ a bit from the O.A.U.’s goals in that they do allow incursions on the 
sovereignty of African nations, but this is still done in the name of border stability 
throughout the continent.   
 The CPA, however, perhaps goes beyond what the A.U. envisioned as its 
mandate.  While the A.U. is not hesitant to utilize peacekeeping missions to ensure 
stability throughout Africa, and did so in Darfur, the CPA demonstrates an acceptance of 
intervention on the part of the A.U. that goes beyond mere peacekeeping operations.  The 
embrace of secessionism in the CPA signals an A.U. that will go beyond the specifics of 
its mandate in order to achieve stability throughout the continent.       
Perceptions of ethnic secessionism, it turns out, perhaps did play a subtle and 
nuanced role in obtaining international recognition for South Sudan.  First of all, while 
ethnic divisions certainly play an integral role in Sudanese politics and may have been a 
factor toward South Sudan’s secession, they aren’t in and of themselves a determinative 
factor as to why recognition occurred.  This can be seen by the fact that ethnic divisions 
and calls for secession exist all around the world, yet ethnicity alone is rarely enough to 
grant an entity recognition by the international community.  Consider the case of the 
Kurds or the Palestinians.  These could be said to be homogeneous ethnic communities, 
yet they do not have nations of their own. 
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 This homogeneity does not necessarily apply to the South Sudanese.  While the 
north’s policy of Arabization and pushing of sharia law certainly alienated many 
Sudanese against the Khartoum government, South Sudan can hardly be characterized as 
an ethnically homogeneous entity.  Additionally, as noted previously, the CPA agreement 
was signed between the Sudanese government and only one faction of a rebel movement.  
This can hardly be shown to constitute the Sudanese nation in its cultural entirety.  Thus, 
it’s hard to conclude that the secession of South Sudan was a case of ethnic separatism.  
Ethnicity played a role, especially through the alienation of black Africans from the Arab, 
Islamic rulers in the north, but it was not the determinative factor in giving international 
recognition to South Sudan.  However, the history of ethnic conflict in Sudan and the 
Darfur genocide may have swayed U.S. sympathies toward the rebels in the South.   
 Darfur is where ethnic secessionism truly played a role in international 
recognition.  Although Darfur lies in the Western region of the country, it was this type of 
ethnic conflict that drew countries such as the U.S. away from supporting the Bashir 
regime.  This is perhaps why the referendum was placed in the CPA in the first place; the 
international community realized that Bashir could not necessarily be trusted and the 
perception of ethnic persecution likely tipped sympathies toward the southern rebels.  
Thus, ethnicity played a nuanced role in international recognition.  While the ethnic 
identity of the southern rebels mattered little, Darfur and Bashir’s reputation for ethnic 
persecution gave them international support.  
 Can the U.S. involvement in the Sudanese peace process be connected to Herbst’s 
assertion that the U.S., throughout the twentieth century, declined to support secessionist 
movements throughout Africa?  It should be recalled that Herbst argued that the United 
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States wanted to maintain the status quo throughout the continent and prevent chaos and 
disunity.  The United States certainly took an interest in Sudan in the 1970’s as a 
counterweight to potential Soviet incursion in Africa.  Additionally, the United States had 
legitimate interests in Sudan as the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist movement grew. 
Perhaps supporting the secessionist movement in South Sudan and conferring recognition 
upon the new nation became the only way the U.S. could ensure stability in Africa.  
Additionally, since the United States was one of the key brokers of the CPA, it almost 
had to support the southern referendum as the provisions of the CPA gradually went 
unimplemented.    
 Ultimately, it seems that many actors had a great stake in what happened in 
Sudan.  It is hard to arrive at overwhelming and swift recognition of South Sudan without 
the interaction of geopolitics into the peace process.  Coupled with the unreliability and 
the abuses of the Bashir government, the international community essentially was ready 
to confer recognition to South Sudan as soon as the referendum occurred.  Perhaps with 
the potential of further violence in Sudan, this was the only means of preserving some 
benefit from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the midst of the chaos that 
continued in Sudan after its signing.  African nations and other states have no interest in a 
chaotic Sudan, and a breakaway southern state without international recognition would 
likely only further perpetuate the crisis.  At least with recognition comes the benefits 
typically conferred upon states, such as the ability to enter into foreign relations, have 
access to international organs such as the U.N., and obtain foreign aid.  South Sudan as 
an independent state perhaps maintains order in the international system better than a 
turbulent Sudan, even if independence for the South leads to a war with its former state.      
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 Thus, it seems that these factors of the perception of ethnic secessionism and the 
geopolitical interests in a peace plan played the largest part in South Sudan’s successful 
secession.  The A.U. likely viewed secession as the key to maintaining stability, but the 
real drivers of international recognition were countries such as the United States.  The 
perceptions of ethnic secession decisively turned the United States against the Bashir 
regime, and the crafting of the CPA itself by multiple international actors led to the 
inclusion of a secession referendum in its language.  Secession must have been a 
foreseeable consequence, and so the international community essentially sanctioned it 
when allowing it to be included in the CPA.   
Seceding, although it may prove to have its downsides, was probably the most 
likely option for stability in Sudan as the referendum deadline dawned.  Actors such as 
the U.S. likely saw this too, and were unwilling to abandon a peace process they had 
shepherded by not recognizing the South.  The CPA, then, turns out to be the crucial 
factor leading to southern secession.  It was a document that called for unity and stability 
but instead led to mistrust and secession.  The question remains as to whether or not 
secession will lead to the original intent of the CPA: peace.        
 
Conclusion 
 After the signing of the CPA, it soon became apparent that secession was likely.  
This further demonstrates that secession must have been endorsed by countries such as 
the U.S. through its inclusion in the CPA.  In 2008, Antwi-Boateng and O’Mahnoy 
published a study on the effectiveness of the CPA’s implementation.  They note 
difficulties that Sudan faced after the signing of the CPA in 2005, such as the death in a 
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plane crash of John Garang, the leader of the SPLM/A.  Furthermore, the CPA provided a 
resolution to the grievances of only two actors in the whole conflict: the Bashir 
government and the SPLM/A.  Antwi-Boateng and O’Mahnoy argue:  
the prospects of Southern independence emanating from a future referendum can 
serve as a double-edged sword.  While the prospects of Southern independence 
assuage SPLM/A concerns, it could set a dangerous precedent for other regions of 
Sudan with grievances against either the NCP-led government in Khartoum or 
Southern tribes—such as the Nuer and the Equatorian tribes that have 
traditionally complained about the dominance of the Dinka in the SPLM/A.  A 
feeling of insecurity about a Dinka-led independent government in the South 
could fuel more conflict amid calls for secession. (2008, 136) 
The CPA may not address the concerns of all the disparate ethnic and religious groups in 
Sudan, since no region of the country is truly homogeneous in its ethnic composition.  
Additionally, the CPA does not necessarily address what happens when leadership 
changes.  With the death of Garang came the ascension to power of Salva Kiir to the 
leadership position of the SPLM/A.  Kiir remained loyal to southern independence rather 
than unity, instead of Garang’s commitment to reconciliation with the Sudanese 
government (Antwi-Boateng & O’Mahony 2008, 132-140). 
  Even in 2010, when Toensing and Ufheil-Somers published their analysis, the 
United States was actively preparing for the emergence of South Sudan as a new nation.  
The U.S.’s 2011 budget had a provision allocating $42 million to USAID to “continue to 
build and transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Southern Sudan from a 
guerilla army to a professional military force” (Toensing & Ufheil-Somers 2010, 13).  
This was accompanied by a State Department request for private companies to begin 
training forces in south Sudan in order to become an effective military force.  The U.S. 
further acceded to the likely scenario of secession when it offered the Sudanese 
government a relaxation of sanctions if it allowed the referendum to go forward and an 
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imposition of harsher sanctions if it didn’t.  Additionally, in the year before the 
referendum happened, both the Bashir government and the SPLM were building up 
stockpiles of arms to be ready for a potential war that was seen as likely if the south 
seceded (Toensing & Ufheil-Somers 2010, 13).   
The secession of South Sudan is a unique case in African history in many 
respects.  Contained within this case study is a glimpse into different factors that may 
lead the international community to confer recognition on certain secessionist 
movements.  Perhaps this analysis can provide justifications as to why South Sudan 
quickly became the world’s newest country, while an entity such as Somaliland does not 
receive recognition.  The combination of perceptions of ethnic secessionism and 
geopolitics provided an entity that, in the eyes of the global community, was ready for 
recognition.  The high level of international participation in the crafting of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which led to the eventual secession, meant that the 
global community was willing to recognize the new nation as soon as it declared 
independence.  Numerous actors had a stake in a peaceful resolution in Sudan.  So, an 
intrusion of nations and transnational organizations occurred despite the earlier O.A.U. 
doctrines of noninterference.  Various states have become involved in internal conflicts 
throughout Africa (witness the recent NATO-led intervention in Libya), but these 
incursions have not led to the formation of new states.   
 Due to the longstanding and intractable nature of the Sudanese conflict, it is likely 
that nations were willing to bypass questions of whether or not South Sudan could 
survive as an autonomous state in an attempt to stop the bloodletting.  Especially with the 
Darfur conflict, international trust in the Bashir government simply collapsed.  Just this 
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year, on April 6th, 2012, rebels of the Tuareg ethnicity in Mali triumphantly announced 
that they had formed a new nation called Azawad, yet the international community did 
not confer recognition on this state, nor did fellow African nations.  “Independence” was 
largely able to be claimed by the Tuareg, claims William G. Moseley, because of the 
unstable political climate in Mali at the time.  Furthermore, this independence was 
achieved through military dominion of several cities rather than a referendum.  Thus, the 
international community had no direct involvement in this independence movement and 
likely feels no pressure to recognize it, unlike they felt with the South Sudanese (Moseley 
2012).    
 It remains to be seen whether or not South Sudan will survive as a viable and 
effective member of the international community.  A question such as that surely exists 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  The recent resumption of hostilities between Sudan and 
South Sudan, however, is not encouraging.  Clearly, the peace that the international 
community thought it was getting with secession was tenuous at best.  It is unclear the 
toll that will be taken with the current fighting between Sudan and its former territory.  
Issues of oil and disputed borders remain to potentially cause another lengthy period of 
mass casualties.  Yet, at least with independence comes self-determination for the people 
of South Sudan.  Although Bashir’s regime is still a threat, it no longer exists as an 
internal menace to the south Sudanese.  Hopefully the people of South Sudan will 
someday be able to enjoy a new era of autonomy and peace promised to them through the 
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